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RIGHTS, DUTIES AND REMEDIES OF THE PARTIES
TO A SALE OF PERSONAL PROPERTY WHICH
IS TO BE DELIVERED AND PAID FOR IN IN-
STALMENTS.
It will be convenient first to consider the legal relations of
the immediate parties to the sale, and then to inquire what
claims third parties have to goods sold in this manner, against
the vendor and vendee. Sales on what is now known as the
"'instalment plan" are of comparatively recent origin, though
contracts for successive deliveries will be found in the old re-
ports. In neither case, however, have the courts taken a broad
view of the subject with regard to the future development of the
law, and each case seems to have been decided according to the
equity of the facts in issue, thus causing a confusion in the cases
which will be found upon inquiry to be more apparent than real.
It is probable that,in the absence of express stipulation at least,
the failure of the vendee to pay an instalment does not so readily
work a forfeiture of the contract as the failure of the vendor to
deliver. This is partly because the legal rate of interest is sup-
posed to be sufficient compensation for the non-payment of
money, and partly because recovery can more easily be had in
an action. The question of the vendor's right to rescind for
failure to pay an instalment depends, however, upon whether or
not the contract is entire.' Prima facie, such contracts are 8ev-
erable,2 but merely because a contract consists of several entire
items which are not to be performed at the same time, and each
of which has a stipulated value, will not be a reason for refusing to
construe it as entire. 8  If each stipulation "so went to the root
of the matter as to make its performance a condition of the obli-
gation to proceed in the contract" it is an entire contract.
4  In
all cases intention governs, 5 and the mode of measuring the price
will not render the contract severable if it was intended to be
1 Thomson v. Conover, 3 Vroom 466.
2 Quigley v. DeHaas, i Norris 267.
3 Smith v. Lewis, 40 Ind. 98.
4 Catlin v. Tobias, 26 N. Y. 217 ; Jenness v. Shaw, 35 Mich. 20.
5 Tipton v. Feitner, 2o N. Y. 423.
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entire.8 If, however, there is an express or implied apportion-
ment of the consideration the contract is severable,7 and where
it is provided that payment shall be made upon the delivery of
each instalment it will be so construed. 8 If, therefore, the con-
tract be construed as entire, and a fortiori if the parties to the
contract express their intention that the contract shall be entire,
or say that the non-payment of any one instalment shall work a
forfeiture as long at least as the contract remains executory the
forfeiture will be enforced. 9 This is the usual manner of draw-
ing up contracts of sale on the instalment plan, and as freedom
of contract is encouraged by the courts, they will usually be car-
ried out according to their intendment. If it is part of the con-
tract that upon failure to pay an instalment the vendor may re-
cover back his property, it has been said that the fact that he
does so does not constitute a rescission of the contract, but a ful-
fillment of it according to its terms. 10 The vendor would not be
guilty of trespass in so doing," even if he use deception in re-
taking his property; 12 but in some jurisdictions it is said that
before the retaking he must exercise his right to Tescind. 1 In
any case the vendor need not tender back the partial payments
already made. 14 But if the goods delivered were not such as
were stipulated for the vendor would be obliged to pay back such
instalments as he has received, 15 together with damages in case
there was a warranty, the contract being then at an end. 16 It has
been said that if the article is not merchantable the vendee may
show this fact and that as much as the article is worth ha been
paid, and thus keep the goods and be absolved from further pay-
ments.17 It is submitted that this is not good law. Each failure
to pay an instalment, is a fresh -breach of the contract. 18 The
strict carrying out of such contracts, however, oftentimes leads
to harsh results, as in the case of Whelan v. Couch,' 9 where the
6 Shinn v'. Bodine, 6o Pa. 182.
7 Lucesco Oil Co.v.Brewer, 66 Pa. 351; Rugg & Bryan v. Moore, iio Pa. 236.
8 Sawyer v. Chicago & N. W. R. R. Co., 22 Wis. 385.
9 Tyson v. Doe, I5 Vt. 571.
10 Latham v. Sumner, 89 Ill. 233.
11 Smith v'. Sozo, 42 Mich. 6.
12 North v. Williams, 12 Centr. Rep. (Pa.) 369.
13 Giddey v. Altman, 27 Mich. 2o6.
14 Haviland v. Johnson, 7 Daly 297; Duke v. Snackleford, 56 Miss. 552.
15 Singer Sewing Mach. Co. v. Treadway, 4 Brawd. (Ill.) 57.
16Dike v. Reitlinger, 23 Hun. 241; American &c. Co. v. Gillette,88 Mich. 231.
17 Guilford, Woods & Co. v. McKinley, 61 Ga. 230.
18 Hunter-v-Daniel, 4 Hare 432.
19 26 Grant's Ch. Rep. 74.
SALE AND DELIVERY IN INSTALMENTS. "i9
tender of the last instalment of $9 on the sum of $1,078 upon
Monday was refused because it had been due on the previous
Saturday, and it was held to work a forfeiture. The sum thus
forfeited was not an extortionate sum regarded as rent, but
whether this be so or not in a given case such a result must
always come from the logical working out of the contract. Up-
on default the seller may resume possession,2
° even though
nothing is said in the contract on this subject, this being an im-
plied condition of the sale. 21 When possession is resumed this in
itself puts an end to the contract and the seller cannot recover
any balance due on the purchase price.
22 But, if he prefer, the
vend6r may bring an action on the price,
2 3 in which case the
buyer cannot offer to rescind.24 The accidental destruction of
the property will probably not excuse the vendee from paying
the purchase price. 25 There may be an express or implied
waiver of the failure to pay an instalment when due, such as the
receipt of a subsequent instalment.2 6 But a waiver of one for-
feiture is not relevant evidence of a waiver of subsequent for-
feitures. 27 Such a waiver will give the buyer a right to com-
plete his title on payment of the residue, but an agent to collect
has no power to make such a waiver.23 If no time is mentioned
for payment it will be presumed that it is to be made on de-
livery,2 9 but if the payments are not to be made in instalments
the time of payment will be on delivery of all the goods,
although the deliveries are successive.3 The vendee must prove
he was ready to receive and pay for the goods as delivered.
81
The purchaser may at any time tender the balance, notwith-
standing the instalments are not yet due, and thus perfect his
title.82 If the vendee fail to pay an instalment the vendor may
refuse to make a subsequent delivery until this is paid, although
20 Wiggins v. Snow, 89 Mich. 476; Goldie v. Rascony, 4 Mont. L. Rep. 313;
Sere v,. McGovern, 65 Cal. 244.
21 Edwards v. Symonds, 65 Mich. 348.
22 Hineman v,. Matthews, 138 Pa. 204.
23 Monroe v,. Williams, 37 S. C. 8r.
24 Appleton vi. Norwalk, 53 Conn. 4.
25 Burnley v. Tufts, 66 Miss. 48.
26 Hutchings v. Munger, 41 N. Y. 155; Cushman v. Jewell, 7 Hun. 525-
Contra: Hegler v. Eddy, 43 Cal 597.
27 Hill v. Townsend, 69 Ala. 286.
28 Hutchings v. Munger, supra.
29 Metz v. Albrecht, 52 Ill. 491.
30 Timmons v. Nelson, 66 Barb 594.
31 Bronson v. Wiman, 4 Seld. x82; Mount v. Lyon, 49 N. Y. 552.
32 Cushman v. Jewell, sujfra.
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otherwise this would be a breach of the contract upon his part. 3
Although these contracts come under the head of conditional
sales, it has been held that an action will lie for an absolute
promise to pay on the part of the vendee.3 If he has been sued
for the price of any one delivery, it seems that he must set up
his damages for failure to make subsequent deliveries by way
of counter-claim, otherwise such defense, is waived.3 5 The pur-
chaser cannot accept an instalment delivered too late and refuse
to pay for it on the ground that he sets the payment off against
the damages sustained by non-delivery. 6 If the sale takes the
form of a lease it is nevertheless generally construed as a condi-
tional sale,87 and parol evidence is admissible to show that the
parties so understood it.38 The vendor cannot treat such a con-
tract as a lease and sue for damages for its breach.3 9 Some
courts have refused to allow such contracts to work a forfeiture
of the instalment already paid unless it is clear that the measure
of damages thus stipulated for is based on adequate compensa-
tion.40 It has accordingly been held that when the vendor re-
sumes possession the buyer can recover an equitable proportion
of the sums already paid.41 This proportion would be the instal-
ments paid less a reasonable sum for hire and damages.42 This
seems to the writer to be an unwarrantable interference with
the freedom of contract. In some States the matter has been
regulated by statute, as in Missouri 43 and Ohio," where it is pro-
vided that the vendor cannot retake his property without tender-
ing back a reasonable amount. Such a statute is not void as
taking away property without due process of law,45 but it is at
the best meddlesome legislation. Equity, however, will not aid
the vendor to recover back his property unless he make restitu-
tion 46 and lapse of time will readily be construed into a waiver.47
83 Raabe v. Squier, 148 N. Y. 81.
34 Marvin Safe Co. v. Emanuel,°21 Abb. N. C. 1S; Affirmed r4 S. R. 681.
35 O'Neill v. Crotty, i6 Daly, 474.
36 Bradley v. King, 44 Ill. 339.
87 Greer v. Churah, 13 Bush. 430.
38 Wire Book Sewing Mach. Co. v. Crowell, 8 Atl. Rep. 22.
39 Loomis v. Bragg, 50 Conn. 228.
40 Johnston v. Whittemore, 27 Mich. 463.
41 Simon v. Edmundson, zo Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 315; Preston v. Whitney, 23
Mich. 260.
42 Snook v. Raglan, 15 S. E. Rep. 364 (Ga,).
43 Rev. St. of Mo., See. 2508.
44 Ohio, Act of 1885, p. 239, Sec. 2.
45 Well v. State, 46 Ohio St. 450.
46 Lincoln v. Quynn, 68 Md. 299.
47 Gorham v'. Holden, 79 Me. 317.
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The later English cases, and some American cases, have formu-
lated a rule which, if not carried too far, should be useful in
solving these contracts. The doctrine ought not to be applied
to contracts in which there is an express stipulation that upon
one default in payment the vendor may resume possession and
the amount paid shall be regarded as rent. These agreements
solve themselves, with the modifications and exceptions noted
above. But where nothing is said on this subject, and there is a
default, it has been decided that this in itself will not work a
forfeiture unless from fhe fact of the default it may be reason-
ably surmised that the vendee did not intend to carry out the
contract. Thus in the leading case of Freeth v. Burr.
48 a failure
to pay an installment because of a mistaken impression on the
part of the buyer that he could withhold payment as a set-off for
the failure to deliver an earlier instalment, was held not to
entitle the vendor to rescind. This case is said to have been de-
cided on the authority of Withers v. Reynolds,
49 though the
analogy is not apparent. And in a later case this doctrine was
approved, the reason for the failure to pay being the erroneous
advice of counsel, and it was said: "You must look at the cir-
cumstances of each case. -* * * You must examine what the
conduct is, so as to see whether it amounts to a renunciation." 
0
An intention to abandon might be inferred from the fact that the
vendee refused to give notes as agreed upon the delivery of each
instalment, and the vendor would be entitled to rescind before
the completion of the contract,
51 or from the failure to sell the
articles for cash and remit payments promptly if this were part
of the contract.52 But if the vendor choose to treat the contract
as subsisting he may sue for each instalment as it falls due.
5 3
In this country several cases are at least authority for the
proposition that "wlere the failure to pay is due to some acci-
dent or oversight, or is attended with facts and circumstances
which are inconsistent with an intention to abandon the contract,
the buyer will not forfeit the benefits of the sale if he makes a
tender of the future instalments of payments," 4 thus putting
48 L. R., 9 C. P. 208.
49 2 B. & A. 882.
50 Mersey Steel & Iron Co. v. Naylor, L. R., 9 Ap. Cases 434.
51 Nichols v. Scranton Steel Co., 137 N. Y. 471; Pattridge v. Gildermeister,
r Keys 93; Stock-dale v. Schuyler, 8 N. Y. Sup. 813.
52 Stewart v. Many, 7 Brawd. 508.
53 Clark v. Dill, ii Atl. Rep. (Pa.) 82.
54 Hime v. Klasey, 9 Ill. Ap. z66; Midland R. R. Co. v. Ontario Rolling
Mills, io Ont. Ap. 77; Gill v. Benjamin, 64 Wis. 362.
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the doctrine above enunciated in a rather negative form. A few
cases, otherwise irreconcilable, can perhaps be solved on the
somewhat broader theory of the English Courts, though these
decisions can by no means be said to settle the matter.6 3 The
question is said to be one of fact for the jury.56 This doctrine,
which is perhaps only an extension of the familiar doctrine of
Hochster v. Delatour 57 and Frost v. Knight,58 is an equitable
one, though an obviously hard one to apply. The decisions fail
to suggest how one party to the contract will be able to surmise
the future intentions of the other party. Moreover, in practice
the theory might be dangerous, for no one would be entitled to
rescind unless he could persuade the court that his views of his
opponent's intentions were correct. Wherever it is adopted the
question ought at least to be a question of law for the court and
should not be left to the jury. Under these circumstances it
may serve to solve contracts which are ambiguous, but it should
not be carried further where entirety was intended. It may be
added that the rule that failure of one payment will work a for-
feiture is the more logical and has the advantage of certainty.
In the majority of cases it can work no harm as the instalments
are usually equivalent to a fair rent, and the other doctrine
savors of a paternal care which the courts ought not to exercise
in construing contracts. The vendee should read his contract
and failure to do so does not excuse him. 59 It may be added
that where it is agreed that payments shall be made in notes,
and upon default the goods are retaken, the vendor cannot sue
upon them. 60 This is sometimes put on the ground of failure
of consideration; but a valid promissory note must be payable
unconditionally, 61 and in another case this is given as the reason
why the notes cannot be sued upon.62 The vendor should, it
seems, return them to the buyer,6 3 and if in the meanwhile he
has transferred them, a bona fide purchaser will be entitled to
55 Winchester v. Newton. 2 Allen 492,; Miner v. Bradley, 22 Pick 459;
Stephenson v. Cady, 117 Mass. 6.
66 Bloomer v. Bernstein, L. R., 9 C. P. 588.
7 2E. & B. 678.
58 L. R., 7 Exch. 114.
59 Mallon v. Story, 2 Ed. Smith 331; Harris v,. Story, 2 Ed. Smith 367;
Ellis v. McCormick, i Hilt 313.
60 Minneapolis Harvester Works v. Hally, 27 Minn.; Campbell Printing
Press Co. z. Henckle, 19 Dist. of C. 95.
61 z Pars. Bills & Notes, 30, 42; Story, Prom. Notes, Sec. 22.
62 3rd Natl. Bank v. Armstrong, 25 Minn. 530.
63 Sumer z. Woods, 67 Ala. 139.
SALE ADVD DELIVERY INV INSTALffENTS.
collect them out of the property retaken in preference to the
seller.64
We now come to the more difficult subject of what will entitle
the vendee to rescind, upon default in deliveries. It is submit-
ted that much of the conflict in the decisions will be eliminated
if we separate the cases in which there was a failure to pay an
instalment from those where the failure was in delivery, recog-
nizing that the two sets of cases have little in common. These
cases are more difficult of solution because they are seldom made
entire by stipulation, and it is often impossible to place the
parties in staft quo. If a cross action is the only relief given the
vendee will get money instead of the article he wished, and the
courts by compelling him to take what he does not want are vir-
tually making a new contract for him. On the other hand, if
rescission is allowed cases will arise where the vendee will have
taken property without paying for it. It will be necessary to
examine a few leading English cases and to trace their influence
on American decisions. Before the case of Boone v. Eyre 65 it is
probable that performance of all the stipulations of a contract on
one side was pre-requisite to suit for a breach on the other. But
in this case an important and far-reaching change in the law
was effected, a view which at first sight seems more equitable
being adopted, and it was said that if the covenant broken went
only to a part of the consideration and compensation in damages
would be an adequate remedy for its breach, then the several
covenants could be treated as independent. This is also the
doctrine of Pordage v. Cole, 66 though in this case the converse is
stated to be true, namely, that if the breach cannot be compen-
sated in damages the stipulation must be construed as a condi-
tion precedent, a proposition which does not receive the
approval of Mr. Parsons. 67 The trouble with these cases, and
those which adopt the same view is that the doctrine is very
hard to apply and leads to an undesirable divergency in de-
cisions of similar facts. The doctrine seems also to beg the
question inasmuch as the breach of any contract can be compen-
sated in damages, otherwise the plaintiff would be in equity;
but no man wishes to take damages when he has made what he
supposes is an entire contract, and on payment of these to be
told that he must complete his part. It is debatable, therefore,
whether in cases of this sort damages are ever really adequate.
64 Kimball v. Mellon, 80 Wis. 133.
65 3 H. Bl. 273.
66 1 Wins. Saund. 319.
47 Pars. on Con., Vol. IL xp. 527.
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Boone v. Eyre, however, has been approved,
68 and doubtless
would have remained good law had it not been for the cele-
brated case of Hoare v. Rennie.
69 This case has probably been
as much criticised as any single decision in the English reports
and is said to have been decided without previous authority.
The contract provided that one hundred and fifty tons of iron
should be delivered in four monthly installments. During the
first month twenty-one tons only were delivered and it was ,held
that the vendee was thereby discharged. It is impossible to
reconcile this case with Simpson v. Crippin,7 where it was
agreed that from six to eight thousand tons of coal were to be
delivered during twelve successive months and the buyer was to
supply wagons to receive them. The first month he sent only
for one hundred and fifty-eight tons, and yet the seller was held
not entitled to rescind. This decision has been criticised as a
"strained construction 7 1 and it is said to be applicable only to
cases where there is a failure to receive the goods, although the
principle is really the same.
It remained for Houck v. Muller
72 to cast the weight of
authority in England for the doctrine laid down in Hoare v.
Rennie. In this case failure to accept any of the first instalment
of goods was held to discharge the seller. Simpson v. Crippin
was thus practically overruled though it was distinguished on
the ground that the contract had been in part performed and
therefore could not be rescinded, it being an elementary princi-
ple that the right of rescission cannot be had when the parties
cannot be placed in statu quo.
73 This does not seem a very log-
ical explanation, however, and Hoare v. Rennie has been since
approved and may be said to be the law of England,
74 with some
modifications which will be noticed later. In America there has
been much conflict in the decisions. It is decided by respecta-
ble authority that when it is agreed that goods are to be de-
livered at a specified time the vendee is not bound to take them
at a subsequent time,7 but this is very far from saying that it
68 Ligget v. Smith, 3 Watts 332.
69 5 H. and N. ig.
70 L. R., 8 Q. B. 14.
71 King Philip Mills v. Slater, 12 R. 1. 82.
72 7 Q. B. D. 92.
73 40 N. J. Law 290.
74 Bradford v,. Williams, L. R. 7 Exch. 259.
75 Behn v. Burness, 3 Best & S. 757; Bowes v. Shand. 2 Ap. Cases 455;
Rouse v. Lewis, 4 Abb. N. Y. App. 121; Lowber v. Bangs, 2Wall. 728; David-
son v. Von Lingen, 113 U. S. 40; Jones v. U. S., 96 U. S. 74; Coon v. Spald-
ing, 47 Mich. 162.
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relieves the purchaser from all the subsequent obligations of the
contract.
In Pennsylvania the court holds to the doctrine of Simpson v.
Crippin, not forgiving the default because it wishes to excuse it,
but because in its view to hold these contracts entire is not a
proper construction, and therefore the most practicable remedy
is by cross action. 78  Mississippi also considers that it is no
ground for rescission that a party does not comply with some of
the stipulations in a contract if there are other provisions inde-
pendent of those in which default has been made.7 7 Again it is
said that such contracts will not be held entire unless the stipu-
lations broken are "made to depend upon the performance of
the whole of the covenants in the entire contract." 78 New
Jersey holds that these contracts are severable,79 but the court in
this State has gone a little further and has applied the rule here-
tofore mentioned in regard to failure to make payments, namely,
that the vendee would be entitled to rescind if the circumstances
of non-delivery were such as to induce a reasonable belief that
the vendor did not intend to carry out his contract,80 and this
seems also to be the view taken in New Hampshire.S1 This
was held in spite of the fact that Lord Chancellor Selborne ex-
pressly says, in Mersey Steel Co. v. Naylor, that the rule only
applies to the case of a buyer failing to pay. So, also, per-
haps, the vendor would be excused from going on with the con-
tract if circumstances render it impossible for the vendee to
carry out the contract, as in the case of insolvency, although
this has been disputed. 82  This is an uncertain term and
the distinctions are finely drawn. The mere fact that the ven-
dee has not money enough in hand to meet his obligations in
the ordinary course of business will not in itself constitute
insolvency; 8 he must be unable to pay his debts.8 But insol-
vency once established, this in itself only relieves the vendor
from giving credit, and if the vendee is able to pay the instal-
ments due, would not excuse the vendor.85 It is probable, how-
76 Obermeyer v. Nichols, 6 Binn. 159; Morgan v. McKee, 27 P. F. Smith 228.
77 Dunlap v. Petrie, 35 Miss. 590.
78 Hewitt v. Berryman, 5 Dana (Ky.) i65.
79 Gerli v. Poidebard Silk Mfg. Co., 3r AUt. Rep. 4o.
80 Blackburn v. Reilly, 47 N. J. Law 290.
81 Hamer v. Tucker, So N. H.
82 N. E. Iron Co. v. Gilbert R. Co., 91 N. Y. i53.
83 Smith v. Collins, 94 Ala. 394.
84 Cunningham v. Martin, L25 U. S. 77.
85 Pardee v. Kanaday, ioo N. Y. 12r.
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ever, that the vendee must pay for future deliveries also to
entitle him to a completion of the contract.86 But the fact that
the vendee has given his note will not prevent the vendor from
rescinding.87 And in many States it is held that in case of re-
scission the vendee must return the articles delivered, or their
value.88 For a long time the weight of authority in America
seemed to be in favor of Simpson v. Crippin, and this was the
view taken by Mr. Benjamin in his work on "Sales." 6 9 But in
Mr. Corbin's edition of this work the contrary is stated. Tile
reason for this opinion is possibly the case of Norrington v.
Wright,90 which not only decided that time was of the essence of
these contracts, which, as before mentioned, may be regarded as
settled by a long line of decisions, but also, in an emphatic
opinion, held that failure to deliver the first instalment was a
competent ground for rescission. The reasoning of Hoare v.
Rennie was expressly adopted by the court. While an impor-
tant decision, it can hardly be said to have exercised much influ-
ence in those States which before leaned toward the opposite
theory. In New York, however, the doctrine of Norrington v.
Wright is expressly adopted, 91 and the principle of entirety as
early laid down in Champion v. Rowley,9 2 disapproving the old
English case of Oxendale v. Wetherell, 93 may be said to be set-
tled law. This later Court of Appeals' decision practically
overrules some earlier cases in the lower courts, which seem to
lean the other way,94 and still another case, it is submitted, may
be distinguished on the ground that the right of rescission was
unwarrantably delayed.95 This was the law of New York, how-
ever, before the case of Norrington v. Wright, the case of Catlin
v. Tobias 96 being a leading authority on the .subject. In this
case the vendor agreed to deliver a certain number of bottles in
instalments for use in the vendee's business, and upon default in
86 Exjiarte Chalmers, L. R., 8 Ch. 289.
87 Diem v. Kobletz, 49 Ohio St. 4r.
88 Gage v. Mayers, 59 Mich. 300; Polhemus v. Holman, 45 Cal. 573; 6
Houston 421; 36 Mo. App. 567: 59 Wis. 272; 43 Iowa, 339.
89 Benj. on Sales, Sec. g0g.
90 115 U. S. X88.
91 Pope v. Porter, 102 N. Y. 366.
92 i8 Wend. 185.
93 9 B. & C. 386.
94 Snook v. Fries, ig Barb. 313; Lee v. Beebe, 13 Hun. 89; Talmage v.
White, 3 J. & S. 218; Swift v. Opdyke, 43 Barb. 274. Contra: Visscher v.
Greenbank, ii Hun. i59.
95 Cahen v. Platt, 69 N. Y. 349.
96 26 N. Y.
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delivery it was held that the vendor could not recover for the
bottles already delivered. The Court held that under the con-
tract the vendee had the right to use the bottles without waiting
to see whether the vendor would complete his contract, and
therefore need not return them. The court went further, and
held that the same principles would apply even if each month's
delivery were regarded as a separate contract. And in a later
case it was said that conceding that the contract was severable
the vendor must at least make one delivery according to its
terms.97
Maryland also adopts the view of the New York courts, pro-
vided, however, that the vendee give reasonable notice to the
vendor of his intention to rescind; 98 and so does Rhode Island; 99
while in Kentucky it was held that performance on one side was
a condition precedent unless some benefit was received on one
side which it would be inequitable to allow that side to retain. 100
It will be seen, therefore, that it can scarcely be said that the
weight of authority is in either direction, but the States take
widely diverging views upon the subject. It may be remarked,
nevertheless, that the most carefully considered decisions apply
the doctrine of entirety as the safer rule in a greater number of
cases. Bramwell, L. J., in Honck v. Muller, suggests the case
of a sale of a suit of clothes, and asks whether, if a coat and vest
should be delivered and there should be a default in the delivery
of the trousers, the vendee could be compelled to pay for the
coat and vest. This is an excellent test of the fairness of the
rule. In some States the unfortunate buyer would have to pay
for the portion of the suit he had received and spend time look-
ing for a pair of trousers to match; in others, he would be com-
pelled only to return the coat and vest, but supposing it to have
become moth-eaten or otherwise spoiled, it would be an open
question as to whether he must pay their value; while in the
United States courts, New York and a few other States, he could
wear the coat and vest without paying a cent for it. It will be
seen that none of these rules give an exactly fair result. The
chief difficulty which has been suggested in following Norring-
ton v. Wright was pointed out by Bramwell, L. J., in Honck v.
Muller, notwithstanding he was one of the majority of the court
in approving Hoare v. Rennie. Subsequently he repudiated this
97 Nightingale v. Eiseman, 121 N. Y. 288.
98 Bollman v. Burt, 6r Md. 4x5.
99 King Phillip Mills v. Slater, su6ra.
10 Trimble v. Green, 3 Dana 357.
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dictum in Mersey Steel Co. v. Naylor, but the difficulty remains.
This occurs where the failure is not in the first delivery but in a
second or subsequent delivery. As was said by the New Jersey
Court, 01 the delivery of the first instalment does not on principle
seem to stand on any different footing from the delivery of any
subsequent instalment; and yet if we apply the doctrine of
Hoare v. Rennie to a second instalment we are running counter
to the well-known principle that the right of rescission must not
be exercised unless we can restore the parties to their original
position.
Most of the cases cited which allow a breach upon a failure
to deliver the first instalment can be easily reduced to con-
formity with the rule already mentioned as in force in New
Jersey, that rescission will be allowed only where the default
evinces an intention not to carry out the contract. It will be
seen that the failure to deliver the first instalment is much more
likely to be given this construction than a subsequent default,
which would more probably be the result of accident. But it is
submitted that any rule of law which compels the vendee, if the
default is on a second or subsequent instalment, to return the
goods received or their value cannot arise from a true construc-
tion of these contracts, but from a desire not to impose a for-
feiture on the vendor. Such a rule practically says to the ven-
dee, "The vendor has not carried out his part of the contract,
but in the interest of fairness we will say that what he has done
practically constitutes a contract between you. Although the
goods you have received may be of no use to you, although they
are not what you contracted for, still you must pay for them, be-
ing content to recoup damages for your vendor's failure," thus
making a breach of contract in itself a new contract between the
parties. The vendee would lose much of the advantage which
might be gained by successive deliveries, because he could never
be sure they would ever be completed. If he wanted a less
quantity he could contract for that amount in the first place in
one delivery, making his own contract and not letting the court
make one for him; if, -on the other hand, he wanted a larger
quantity it would seem that to be safe he must order it all at once
to be delivered in one instalment. Contracts are made to be
kept and not broken, and the courts should be only too willing to
adopt a rule which will be an incentive to keep them. Any
other rule will permit the vendor to keep a contract if favorable
to him or break it if it prove disadvantageous. Such a "con-
101 31 AtI. Rep. 401.
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struction" of these contracts as the above is not logical, and it
can have no force in a State like New York, where the doctrine
of entirety has a firm hold. In this State at least the case of
Catlin v. Tobias seems to be authority for the view that failure
to deliver a second instalment would work a forfeiture equally
with a default in the first delivery, and this view is taken by a
case in a lower court.10
2
In view of the conflicting decisions and the unfairness of
either rule in given cases, a rule is with diffidence suggested for
which the writer can cite no authority. Where the contract is
for the sale of goods of the like of which there is no dearth on
the market upon default in a delivery the vendee should be
allowed to make a new contract with another vendor for delivery
of the remainder. He should pay the first vendor for what he
had delivered, and should be allowed to counterclaim damages
for failure to deliver the remainder the measure of which would
be the difference in the price of the goods under the new agree-
ment and the old. In cases of this sort such a rule can do no
harm. But where the contract is for the delivery of rare and
valuable articles, or goods of a particular manufacture or brand,
the forfeiture should be enforced, on the principle that "where
there has been no beneficial service there shall be no pay." 103
It may very well be that the vendee would have but little use for
a lesser quantity of such articles as these and he perhaps could
not obtain the remainder of a quality to suit him elsewhere.
Certainly, if the rule of Harmony v. Bingham
4 is good law,
that a vendor is not excused by act of God, he should not be ex-
cused under an entire contract where the failure to deliver was
due to his own fault.
Where the vendee sues for failure to deliver the vendor may
show in reduction of damages that the vendee could have
obtained the same goods from others at the same price.
105 This
would seem to be in accordance with the first part of the above
rule. Or he may show unreasonable delay in exercising the
right to rescind. 106 Or he may show a waiver, as the acceptance
of a smaller amount,107 but a waiver of one delivery does not
give the buyer the right to carry this waiver over "to the next
102 Levene v'. Rabbitte, 2 N. Y. Supp. 38 9 .
108 Farnsworth v. Garrard, i Camp. 38.
104 1 Duer. 209.
105 Saxe vz. Penokee Lumber Co., ii Ap. Div. 291.
106 Morgan v. McKee, 77 Pa. 228; Byers v. Chapin, 28 Ohio 300.
107 Avery v. Wilson, 8z N. Y. 341; Silberman v. Fretz, 12 Ap. Div. 328.
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instalment and demand the amount then due together with the
deficiency of the preceding instalment." 108 Or he may show
that the vendee has prevented performance.109 Parol evidence
may be admitted to show that a written contract of sale has been
enlarged and more deliveries provided for.110 The failure to
deliver does not work a forfeiture unless the buyer choose to re-
gard it as terminated," but if he choose to rescind he must do
so in toto, 12 and unequivocally.1 13 When the contract has been
rescinded, in those States where the vendor is allowed to recover
for what he has already delivered his remedy would be on a
quantum meruit.14  If the subject of the sale were animals and,
without the knowledge of either party, they were dead at the
time of contract, or if merchandise were destroyed by fire under
similar circumstances, the sale would be thereby avoided; 115
though if part only were destroyed the buyer would have his
option to take the remainder with an abatement of the price. 116
Where nothing was agreed upon as to the time oE delivery of the
various instalments the question would be one for the court, 117
whether the delivery was made within a reasonable time.118 If
the goods are to be delivered, "as fast as they may be pro-
duced," they should be delivered as fast as the operation of the
vendor's plant will permit.119
It is now proposed to inquire briefly as to where the title to
the goods remains in sales by instalments. This is largely a
matter of public policy in each State, and the question is one of
importance for it is a recognized principle of the law of personal
property that no man can be divested of it without his consent. 120
And as is said in Shepherd's "Touchstone": 121 "It is a general
rule that when a man hath a thing he may condition with it as,
108 Johnson v. Allen, 78 Ala. 387.
109 Rouse v. Lewis, 4 Abb. N. Y. App. 121; Young v. Hunter, 6 N. Y.
203; Holmes v. Holmes, 9 N. Y. 525.
110 Ham v. Cerniglia, 73 Miss. 290.
111 O'Neill v. James, 43 N. Y. 84.
112 Raymond v. Barnard, 12 Johnson 274; Hogan v. Weyer, 5 Hill 39o;
Moyer v. Shoemaker, 5 Barb. 322.
113 Hunt v. Siger. i Daly 206; Ehrensperger v. Anderson, 3 Exch. I58.
114 Planche v. Colburn, 8 Bing. 14.
115 Wood & Foster's case, i Leon. 42.
116 2 Kent Com. 469.
117 2 Greenl. 249.
118 Sawyer v. Hammott, 15 Me. 40.
119 Stewart v. Marvel, iot N. Y. 357.
120 20 Wend. 275; 1 Hill 303.
121 Shepherd's Touchstone, 118, 119, 120.
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he will. A contract or sale of a chattel personal, as an ox or the
like, may be upon condition and the condition doth always
attend and wait upon the estate or thing whereunto it is
annexed; so that although the same do pass through the hands
of an hundred men, yet it is subject to the condition still."
This is still substantially the law in Massachusetts and the title
to the property remains in the vendor until all the payments are
made, and he can follow the property even in the hands of an
innocent purchaser.14 He may retake the goods from his ven-
dee or sub-vendee without notice, 123 or even from an attaching
creditor of the vendee. 12 To entitle him to do this the parties
must have intended that the title remain in the vendor,123 and
delivery without requiring payment is presumptive evidence of
a contrary intention,128 the burden of proof being on the vendor
to show the true intention of the parties. 23 When this intention
is evident the vendee gets no title whatever until payments are
made, and consequently can given none.128 The vendor could,
therefore, on condition broken, give good title to some new pur-
chaser without actually retaking possession of his property. 129
Nor would a policy of insurance be discharged by such a con-
tract of sale. 3 0 But before the day mentioned for payment the
vendor, it seems, cannot bring trover for the goods.131  Upon
payment the vendee acquires title to the property without
further bill of sale, 32 and in Rhode Island it is said that the
vendee has such possession that he may sell or mortgage the
goods and that upon payment of the last instalment the title of
the mortgagee or sub-vendee would defeat an attachment for debt
by the original vendor.1 33 This same general rule is applied in
some other States, 13 but in New Jersey the vendor must not
122 Merrill v. Bank of Norfolk, 19 Pick. 32.
123 126 Mass. 482; 103 Mass, 517; 9 Allen 17i.
124 3 Cush. 257.
125 Denney v. Williams, 5 Allen 3.
126 1 Seld. 45; 6 Pick. 266.
127 Riddle v. Varnum, 20 Pick. 283.
128 Cogill v,. Hartford & N. H. R. R., 3 Gray 545; Deshon v. Bigelow, 8
Gray 159; Barrett v. Pritchard, 2 Pick. 512; Reed v,. Upton, 1o Pick. 522.
129 Hubbard v. Bliss, 12 Allen, 59o.
130 Boston & Salem Ice Co. v. Royal Ins. Co., 12 Allen 381.
131 Newhall v. Kingsbury, 131 Mass. 445.
132 Currier v. Knapp, 117 Mass. 324; Chase v. Ingalls, 122 Mass. 381.
133 Carpenter v. Scott, 13 R. I. 477.
131 Sanders v. Keber & Miller, 28 Ohio St. 630; Cole v. Berry, 42 N. J.
Law 308; Tibbetts v. Towle, 12 Me. 341; 41 Cal. 455; x Wis. '4'; i6 Mich.
i59; 38 Tex. 234; Bradshaw v. Warner, 24 Ind. 58. '
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give the vendee anyindicia of ownership beyond mere possession
or be guilty of conduct which the law would consider fraudu-
lent. 3 5 This seems to be the law in England,186 and doubtless
the latter part of the rule would hold good everywhere. It is on
the ground of constructive fraud that other jurisdictions have
refused to allow the title to remain in the seller as against credi-
tors or bona fide purchasers from the vendee,13 7 and Pennsyl-
vania stands very strongly by this rule. In Illinois they admit
that mere possession of goods will not defeat title in the true
owner, 38 and that the presumption of title arising from pos-
session of personal property may be overcome,13 9 but they refuse
to apply this principle to conditional sales and it is well settled
that as against creditors or bona fide purchasers reservation of
title in the original vendor is invalid, 40 and with this view other
States agree.' 4' In New York a rather untenable and useless
distinction is taken between conditional sales and conditional de-
liveries. 142 In the early case of Wait v. Green, 43 it was thought
that it would not be public policy to allow the vendor to reserve
title against an innocent purchaser. This case was supported
by a large number of early decisions. 144 The case was "distin-
guished" by Ballard v. Burgett, 145 and was for all practical pur-
poses overruled, and as this case has been subsequently
approved,4 6 there is no doubt that in this State the original
vendor could retain good title. It is submitted that there is no
real distinction between conditional sales and conditional de-
liveries, but that it arose from the not very praiseworthy desire
of the Court of Appeals not to overrule Wait v. Green. At any
rate the distinction is one which other courts have been unable
135 Marvin Safe Co. v. Norton, 48 N. J. Law 410.
136 Dyer v. Pearson, io Eng. C. L. 20.
137 Heryfard v. Davis, 102 U. S. 235; Hervey v. R. I. Locomotive Works,
93 U. S. 664; Copeland v. Bosquet, 4 Wash. Cir. C. R. 594; Rose v. Story, i
Pa. St. 190; Haak v. Linderman, 64 Pa. St. 499; Martin v. Mathiot, 14 S. &
R. 214.
138 Klein v. Siebold, 89 Ill. 54o.
139 Fawcett v. Osborn, 32 Ill. 4M1.
140 Murch v. Wright, 46 Ill. 487; Jennings v. Gage, 13 111. 6o; Brundage
v. Camp, 21 Ill. 330; McCormick v. Hadden, 37 Ill. 370.
141 Vaughn v. Ricketts, 1874 Ky. Ct. of Appeals; Gerrish V. Clark, 64 N.
H. 492.
142 Comer v. Cunningham, 77 N. Y. 391; Dows v. Kidder, 84 N. Y. 121.
148 36 N Y.
144 Smith v. Lyons, s N. Y. 41; 25 Barb. 474.
145 40 N. Y.
140 Austin v. Dye, 46 N. Y.
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to see. It is suggested that the New York rule is the same as
the Massachusetts rule, though probably the courts would be
more ready to find grounds of estoppel on the part of the origi-
nal vendor, for it is stated that "where the owner of property
confers upon another an apparent title to or power of disposi-
tion over it he is estopped from asserting his title as against an
innocent third party who has dealt with the apparent owner in
reference thereto without knowledge of the claim of the true
owner."1 47 It is probable, also, that the courts here would be
ready to apply the rule laid down in California, that if it may be
seen from the entire transaction that the title is to pass, and
that the form of sale was only adopted in order to give greater
security to the vendor the reservation will be void.
148 It may
be added that when the purpose of the sale is that the vendee
place the goods again on sale the reservation of title in the
original vendor will be void against purchasers.
149 Although in
New York it seems that such sales are not void against creditors,
they may levy upon the goods in the hands of the vendee, and
pay to the vendor the purchase price thereof, and thereby
acquire title themselves, 1 ° though this could not be done after
the time for payment had expired. 151 The Massachusetts rule
seems to the writer the more logical (and in point of fact the
New York rule is practically the same) than the Pennsylvania or
Illinois rules. There seems to be no good reason why the rule
of caveat emptor should not apply in these cases, and certainly
following too strictly the doctrine of Twyne's Case on which the
other rule is based is bound to work injustice in the end. More-
over, there is no justice in making the original vendor give
credit when he does not choose to do so. If credit be given the
sale passes title,152 and if the vendor take other security the title
to the goods will not remain in him, but the taking of a note is
not such security as will pass the title.
15 There does not seem
to be much hardship therefore in the case of an innocent pur-
chaser finding that the title was reserved in the vendor and
while, as was pointed out by the Connecticut Court, "it is the
established policy of our law to hold a man's property subject to
147 McNeil v. Tenth National Bank, 46 N. Y. 325.
148 Palmer 'v. Howard, 72 Cal. 293.
149 Mfg. Co. v. Carmen, 9 N. E. Rep. 707; Cole v. Mann, 62 N. Y. I.
150 Frank vz. Batten, 49 Hun. 91.
151 Buckmaster and Smith, 22 Vt. 203.
152 Leonard v. Davis, r Black. 476.
153 Campbell Printing Press Co. v. Walker, 1r4 N. Y. 7.
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the payment of debts, yet * * * a man may appear to have,
and in fact, actually have, a valuable interest in property which
is beyond the reach of legal process. * * * Should evils
spring up under the law as it now is, the Legislature, it is to be
presumed, will in due time provide the proper remedy. "'U The
statute which is intended to provide for this in New York 155 is a
flagrant example of the corrupt and slipshod legislation of this
State. Everything is excepted from the statute whose manufac-
turers desired to continue sales on the instalment plan, and
almost every year some new list of articles is excepted, so that
now it has almost no application to the law of instalment sales.
It may be remarked, also, that the statute does not affect the
rights of creditors and protects only subsequent purchasers and
mortgagees without notice, 15 and that the remedy required, as
pointed out by the Connecticut Court, is wanting. The statute
is construed strictly; it would seem that it must be strictly
complied with, and in those States where the statute applies
to creditors it would protect creditors before the sale as well as
after, and even if they had knowledge of its terms.1 7 It is well
settled that property placed upon realty under a contract that
title shall not pass to the vendee will not become a part of the
realty. 68 And if goods are to be placed in a deliverable state
and payment made as the work progresses the title will not
pass. 5 9
It is said that the lex loci of these contracts should govern,'6
but in New Jersey a Pennsylvania vendor was allowed to re-
claim his property in New Jersey, though in his own State he
would not have been allowed to do so. 161 This shows that in
this class of sales public policy, with its consequent uncertainty,
is more apt to govern than settled rules of law.
Raymond Sandford White.
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